

Candidate 1 evidence

82. AJP Taylor has called Winston Churchill "the saviour of his country." Indeed, Churchill's wartime leadership was irrefutably strong and seen by most as what led Britain to ultimate victory. However, his success can be a topic of controversy, the Sydney Morning Herald in 1987 branding Churchill as "a drunk who cost Britain her Empire." The validity of Churchill being ^{the} Britain's "saviour" shall be assessed on his role in pulling together Britain's parliament that had been divided under Neville Chamberlain. The ~~the~~ impact of his personality on his wartime leadership shall be examined to see if he had qualities to lead. Additionally, Churchill's role as an

international diplomat, particularly with the Americans and Russia has to be considered in his part as an effective Prime Minister. Finally, the sometimes suspect military strategy ~~was~~ he imposed will determine whether he was "a saviour".

Churchill's greatest significance comes from much of his work within parliament as he was not only credible, but successful, alternative to laissez-faire and appeaser Chamberlain. In his War Cabinet, Churchill included not only his Conservative rivals Chamberlain and Halifax, but also Labour leader Atlee, and

Greenwood. Much of Britain's problems in 1939-40 derived from the lack of political cohesion and Churchill's effort to unite parties in a wartime coalition proved successful and vital for the war effort on the Home Front. Arguably, Churchill was among the few ^{Tories} ~~at~~ Labour would work with, ^{Atlee says they were "treated like dirt" by Chamberlain} and historians such as Tony Corfield believe their support was essentially to winning the war from home. A strength of Churchill's lay in his strategic appointments. Ernest Bevin, head of the TUC, was made Minister of Labour to effectively mobilise the workforce. Had Churchill not made this appointment, the

country's economy and effort would have significantly plummeted, unable to withstand German superiority. Indirectly, through Bevin's work, he was "saviour". However, Churchill did make himself Minister of Defence in order to have direct contact with Chiefs of Staff. Not only was this a heavy workload, it gave Churchill ~~power~~ greater power. It was not 'saviour'-like, as seen by revisionists and Charmley, for Churchill to have complete control and work himself in such important matters, his wartime leadership more a game. ~~It~~ Nevertheless, Churchill did not rule as a despot, ~~with~~ ~~out~~ all

votes were held in the House of Commons on major issues. His wartime leadership was greater because of the extra influence he held, as well as hearing MPs ~~concerns~~ concerns. ~~The vast~~
The appointment of his friend, Lord Beaverbrook, to the position of Aircraft Production seemed reminiscent of Chamberlain's cronyism. And yet, aircraft production soared in the years of Beaverbrook's role (over 400 more planes produced than Germany). Churchill's expertise at cleverly appointing people worked wonders, and did make him a great leader. It is argued that often the Home Front was left too much to

Atlee, and Churchill did prefer military matters, but it was a failure to have ~~on~~ less than a holistic view of wartime Britain. His appointments were right, however, and no one better than Atlee, a socialist, could be trusted with more minor Home Front matters.

Churchill's personality has made him an iconic WWII figure. A borderline alcoholic, Churchill's 'midnight follies' did not always prove prudent. Planning war strategy at small hours when exhausted was risky and dangerous, showing an apparent carelessness in Churchill's leadership.

Impulsive, and stubborn, ~~Walker~~ Churchill could be petulant when refusing to listen to experts like Alan Brooke. Richard Holmes believes Brook and Dowding to be the real genius behind ~~the~~ successes like the Battle of Britain and so Churchill's ~~own~~ reluctance to listen to them ~~is~~ willing suggests less than 'saviour' like and good wartime leadership. There is little on Churchill's power as an orator. ~~Walker~~ Paul Addison calls Churchill's communication with the public and allies 'beyond dispute'. Speeches like 'victory at all costs' inspired the public who were war-weary into pushing on. For

this truly Churchill was 'a saviour' of British people. Whilst his personality was often volatile, it greatly impacted on how he ran his home Front, war, and international affairs. His flaws reduce his effectiveness, and so his role on clear parliamentary leadership remains the best example of Churchill's successes. But his work as an orator links across all of his triumphs.

With a natural affinity for America, his mother, and his great powers of speech, Churchill succeeded in breaking isolationist America's silence.

Lend Lease was secured: a \$4.2bn loan with 2% interest

for the duration of the war, Britain had been in desperate need of financial help, her gold reserves down £30m in just 15 months of war, and Churchill's work to secure this help secured Britain's longevity; he was a saviour in this respect as seen by Mark Donnelly. In the Allied countries, Churchill held much influence. This is shown by the postponed D-Day. Both Stalin and Roosevelt had wanted it by 1942, but Churchill remained adamant that Britain was not ready for it, postponing ensured greater chance of success and Churchill's role in this international diplomacy.

was played well. ~~However~~ On the other hand, Churchill was just a symbol. By Tehran Conference 1943 ~~was~~, Churchill became a subordinate, excluded from private talks with Stalin and Roosevelt. ~~Churchill~~ ~~was~~ He did little to influence and had strategy imposed on him, and so his leadership of Britain became undermined on a world-scale. The so-called 'Naughty Document' saw Churchill propose a ludicrous settlement to Stalin in a bid to sell off Eastern Europe for power. Whilst this did not affect Britain being saved, it made for Churchill to be more rash

and desperate in his overall decisions and was a clear weakness. As Richard Overy concludes; 'It was difficult to say Allies succeeded despite Churchill'. His initial international diplomacy and representation of Britain gave great insight to his role as a war leader ^{in personality}, but had little impact on his role in making shattering decisions for Britain, succeeding only to embroil them further with America, which was better ~~at~~ working than the Japan/Germany agreement, but brought much criticism to Churchill by ^{the public} ~~the~~ of military and economic entanglement.

finally, Churchill's wartime leadership of the military is often seen as suspect. The removal of division from North Africa to Greece is seen by Seaman as a 'grave error of judgement' as Greece fell regardless and the war in Africa prolonged by as much as two years; Churchill's decisions were often misinformed and 'helter-skelter'. However, a redeeming ~~is~~ military strategy Churchill is defined by is the no surrendering to Germany, even at Britain's bleakest during Dunkirk. Boris Johnson argues "no one else could have conceivably given that

kind of leadership", and this essay is inclined to believe this. By bearing through ~~the~~ the Nazi onslaught, morale of Britain was improved as was military support. It showed to the world Britain was in for the 'long-haul' and aided determination for victory. Churchill's part in the Battle of Britain saw a Gallup Poll saying '80% believed Britain could win' and the importance of this morale cannot be understated. The country would fight on to no more major disasters after El Alamein.

~~Despite~~ Churchill's leadership or ^{successful} military strategy was defined

again by his personality, clever appointments and its American and Russian help, other factors contributing to its success. The disasters in Italy, France, Greece, and Africa however show Churchill ~~as~~ as exacerbating the early war and thus it is the the least extent valid evidence of the country being saved.

To conclude, to say that Churchill was "a saviour of his country" would be to a considerable extent, valid. His appointments on the Home Front and ~~a~~ work at a coalition

are the greatest example of a good wartime leader. His personality contributed to much of his work and success across wartime Britain and made him certainly sound like 'a saviour'. However his role in international diplomacy burnt out by 1943 and harmed Britain's role in the Allies, and much of Churchill's military choices were wrong like in North Africa. This significantly impacted his role as a good leader and so ~~the~~ 'saviour' may seem exaggerated.

86. Sources A and B only partially reveal differing interpretations of which ~~is~~ Chamberlain resigned.

Source A says: "The dismal failure of the Norway campaign brought matters to a head." Indeed, despite being Churchill's idea, the British army was ill equipped to capture and hold Narvik, reflecting on Chamberlain's inability to effectively lead the military, giving his critics opportunity to pressure him to resign by a Vote of No Confidence.

Source A also says: "over thirty members of his own party voted

against him and twice as many abstained." This means that ~~Chamberlain~~ Chamberlain was led to resigning in May '40 because of Conservative backlash, and his majority of 200 had lessened by over half. His support was so tentative, resignation would have seemed logical.

Source A ~~and~~ tells of the: "damaging speeches that had been made." This means that the parliamentary critics ~~were~~ ~~did~~ went publicly announcing their mistrust. The Source does not reveal the example of Leo Amery symbolically echoing Oliver Cromwell which would have had great

influence on pressuring Chamberlain to resign by comparing him to a useless king.

Source B says how: "a further major criticism of Chamberlain concerned his handling of the wartime economy." This is often seen as a factor pressuring Chamberlain to resign as Britain was unprepared to finance a war and this reflected badly on Chamberlain's right wing policy. These added to the ~~the~~ criticisms of his opponents. However, historian G.C. Peden does not believe that this influenced Chamberlain's resignation as "striking a balance" on a wartime economy

was exceptionally difficult and whenever was in power would have made mistakes.

Source B says: "Chamberlain's refusal to create a new post ~~for~~ with overall responsibility for coordinating the war" was a way of interpreting why Chamberlain resigned. This is because all early war errors were reflected back on Chamberlain, not a Minister, and there were many mistakes up until 1940 reducing his credibility as a leader.

Finally; Source B says: "almost a million workers remained unemployed by spring 1940, yet many factories were working below full capacity." This illustrates how the public grew tired of Chamberlain as he did not make effort to rectify this problem. There was demand from the unemployed for his resignation.

The sources do not include Tony Corfield's interpretation. He believes Chamberlain's refusal to work with the TUC and Labour party would see and "end to Chamberlain's regime" as he would have

more opposition than support. The leftists would be against him.

The sources do not include his inability to woo America. Chamberlain called Americans "a bunch of cads" and did not attempt to break their isolationism. American support would not be forthcoming with Chamberlain in charge and with finances poor, it was unlikely for him to stay if it meant no American help.

International diplomacy with Russia is not mentioned.

Chamberlain met with Hitler 3 times, but not once with Stalin. When the USSR allied with Germany, there was little doubt it was Chamberlain's fault, pressuring him to resign.

The appeasement policy is not stated. Historians believe that because he staked his whole reputation on it working, when it failed ~~and~~ he would have to go. Robert Mackay says it was all thought out.

Chamberlain's 'business as usual mantra' is key to the personal policy he refused to let go. This

ill prepared Britain's economy as materials were not used for war, but for exporting. It gave other nations a false sense of Britain's security in the war meaning Chamberlain was to blame.

It is not mentioned that not 1 Trade Union member was on the Ministry of Supply. Chamberlain did not have the support of the working class and there were many who wanted him to resign from his role.

The role of Churchill is omitted. He was seen as a credible alternative to lead a war, and Labour would work with him. Chamberlain had, as Atlee says, 'treated Labour like dirt' and the need for a coalition was done so Chamberlain was pressured to go.

87. Source C is quite useful as it ~~mem~~ is from 1947, so a primary account of the war. This is useful because their will be insider knowledge and influence the quality of details secondary sources do not have on the bombing campaign.

It is less useful because it is by Arthur 'Bomber' Harris. This is because he was in charge of bombing and so will be biased in favour of it being successful.

Source C says: "The effect on German morale... was extremely serious" This is useful as it

shows how bombing was successful in exhausting Germans making them less willing to fight.

Source C is useful because it says "The attack on ~~the~~ Dresden was considered a military necessity." This is useful because it gives insight to the bombing campaign's success on morality, which was severely skewed by killing so many civilians.

Source C says: "overwhelming effect of the Battle of Hamburg" This is useful because it shows how the Allied bombing affected:

major German ports and hampered their supplies.

Source C is less useful as it ~~does not~~ does not say how German output in 1942 ~~was~~ increased by 50%, showing the campaign to be unsuccessful.

Historian Stephen Roskill is of the opinion that too much emphasis was put on bombing as nearly 10% of RAF failed to return on missions. This would have been useful if included.

87. Richard Overy, however, believes the bombing to be successful as much of Germany's oil was destroyed meaning the Luftwaffe had only 10,000 tons of fuel and could not fight back efficiently. This would have been useful to include.

The source is less useful as it does not include the bombing of German occupied French railroads, which was successful in helping D-Day as Germany became immobile in the country.

The source would have been

more useful if it included that 20% of BMW workers in Germany were absent significantly reducing German production.

Source C would be more useful if it said the campaign was successful for Britain's morale. 'The bomber alone provides means of victory' and Britons liked being able to attack rather than be defensive.

The source would be more useful had it include how initially bombers were so inaccurate, if they came within

10 miles of target, it was good. This shows the limits to the early Allied bombing campaign.

The source would be more useful if it said 12% of war budget put towards it by 1944. This is often seen as too much for the limited success achieved by historians like Colvin.

88. Source D is only partly full at explaining the success of ~~the~~ Labour's 'New Jerusalem'.

Source D says: "the govt lost no time... [nationalising] the Bank of England". By nationalising banks, a 'New Jerusalem' was created by control the economy to help welfare state.

Source D ~~is~~ is fuller as it says: "Coal nationalisation was scarcely more controversial". This means that in nationalising coal, Labour's success was tinged with doubt and buying off mine owners was not planned. However, it does suggest

Success at saving a declining industry.

The source does not include the National Health Service Act 1947 were the British could get free, comprehensive health care to improve their lives. This success still lasts today, although it's popularity meant that dental charges had to be brought in by 1950, which was a failure in socialist aims.

It does not include the promise of 250,000 homes being built. Roger Eatwell uses this as a failure of Labour as it

did not build that many,
it's success was marred by focus
on health.

It ~~does~~ omits the small success
in education. 1939 index
figure of 76 was increased
to 122 by 1947. This meant
more working class had better
education, but Pollard believes
this did not go far enough
as in the 11+ test, middle
class could afford tutors so
it was not a society of
equals in a 'New Jerusalem'.

85. Historian Seaman argues that by 1951, Labour were 'out of ideas'. The party that had promised a 'New Jerusalem' had delivered, but still they lost the election. Much of this can be attributed to Atlee's policy of austerity, however, other factors existed such as the strength in the Conservative campaign and uncontrollable circumstance.

By 1951, Labour had lost 40% of its middle class vote. The austerity and taxation of the government on the middle class had gone on too long. The middle class

could afford luxuries but could not buy them with rationing and austerity still in place.

Conservatives promised to keep the welfare state as well as offer more economic freedom; the public were convinced.

Further more, disenchantment with austerity was greater with America's capitalist boom.

The example of abroad angered the voters that they could not have such luxuries like the cars Britain was exporting at an exceedingly high rate. Furthermore, the wealthy were less likely to require the welfare state, already having had the benefits

of money before the war. Austerity seemed a redundant measure for the electorate and so, to a great extent, they abandoned Labour.

To a smaller extent, the role of Tony's campaign 'This is the Road' brought the electorate to Conservatives. The 'Guilty Men' that Michael Foot insists repelled the voters were replaced by forward thinking policies: 300,000 homes to be built. This is significant as Labour had failed to do this in their time in power. Conservatives abstained from negative

campaigning, unlike Labour who branded the Tories 'vermin'. Eatwell believed that the Labour campaign did not propose changes, only a continuation of before, whereas Conservatives read the public well and offered limited government controls. This ties in with the public's disenchantment with austerity being the greatest reason of Labour's defeat. However, where Labour failed ~~caused~~ might have caused their downfall, the Conservatives succeeded to fill a gap. The electorate may not have left Labour so much had Conservatives failed to promise

better.

finally, there were circumstances at which either parties control that proved in favour of the Conservatives. The Liberal party fell into debt and, unable to have candidates in constituencies, voters were left with a choice of Labour or Conservative. ~~Results~~ A Mass Observation suggests that out of every 5 Liberal voters, 2 would vote Labour and 3 Conservative. There was more votes available to Tories as they were right wing like Liberals (although more centre.). Additionally, Labour's leader, Clement Attlee, was hospitalised.

ESTION

It is often argued that he held Labour together, but his illness and the dramatic resignation of Bevan meant Labour was no longer the party it was when it won a landslide 129 majority in 1945.

To conclude, Labour's policies of austerity truly created an antipathy towards them. The Conservatives ~~written~~ clever campaign in 1951 ensured their victory as they learned their lessons from 1945 and read the mood of the public. To the smallest extent, factors outwith party control like illness and the fall of the Liberals had impact on the result of the election, causing Labour to 'self-destruct' and no longer be fit for office.